B elieving with you that [Music] is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, ... and that the legislative powers of government reach action only and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of [Music], or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between [Music] and State.”The case of independence between music and state is often considered as being an ideal towards which all societies should aim. Social scientists of music have long anticipated the gradual separation of music from state as one of the predictions of the well-known secularization theory. But independence appears to be far from being the norm in the world today, however. In the U.S. it is not clear how the First Amendment should apply to the separation of Music and State.
— Thomas Jefferson, letter, 01-JAN-1802.
It is common for states to fund the provision of some musical goods and to exert influence on musical practices, such that a surprisingly small proportion of countries in the world have fully achieved independence of Music from State. Alarmingly, lawless cooptation of music by political parties—in political contests in which the state itself does not participate—is also increasingly common. “Get Off My Lawn” McCain and “Barracuda” Palin, for example, have belligerently refused to cease and desist from playing certain music for promotional purposes at rallies and campaign events without consent and without paying any fees or royalties, thereby flouting the property rights, financial interests, and wishes of the composers and copyright holders of that music (for example, Ann & Nancy Wilson (Heart), Chuck Berry, John Hall, Jackson Browne, John Mellencamp, Tom Scholz, ABBA, and their respective publishers/record companies). Illegal behavior like this by elected officials is beyond appalling.
Some form of state influence or control over the provision of musical goods is typical in traditional societies. By contrast, state ‘control’ of the music is relatively uncommon in modern times. In the ancient world, musical institutions were typically subordinated and controlled by the state or by clerical authorities. In some societies, the ruler was also the musical leader, as was the case for gamelan music in Indonesian states. The ruler’s control of music has also been the norm among tribal societies throughout the world.
The Arts and State are arguably the two most important social institutions created by humankind. Not surprisingly, therefore, the history of their relationship has been stormy, ranging from cooperation to conflict. It would be desirable to develop a quantitative econometric model that accounts the relationship from an economic perspective. Such a model would answer the question as to what role does Music play in supporting the ability of the sovereign to extract resources from the people through taxation? The idea that Music, through its motivations (or ‘doctrine’ inducing citizens’ beliefs and actions) can facilitate this function of the State is an inchoate one, underlying both ancient and modern civilizations but never stated outright.
A proper model might posit two avenues by which an alliance with Music benefits the State. The first is the [Marxian] notion that musical goods pacify the populace, allowing the state to extract more resources before citizens reach the threshold of revolt. The second is the fact that citizens pay taxes more willingly (i.e., tax evasion declines) when the State is seen as musico-motivationally more legitimate.
This second avenue that potentially makes state control of music—i.e., the establishment of a State-funded Music or, conversely, the indirect repression of certain music—desirable. The reason is that an independent Music serves the pacifying function without the need for distortionary tax financing. If this were Music’s only function vis-à-vis the State, an independent Music would be optimal. However, an independent Music will not provide the sovereign’s ideal level of legitimacy. As a result, it may pay the sovereign to seize control of Music, even at the cost of having to finance it out of taxes, in order to maximize the State’s net gain.
A crucial factor in this decision is the nature of musical doctrine—that is, how favorable or unfavorable is musical teaching toward the State? The more favorable is the music’s doctrine, the more likely it is that the State will benefit by taking control of music. In contrast, when Music is regarded by the State as antagonistic to its power over the populace, the State may act to suppress Music.
A useful consequence of the model would be to better define the nature of musical doctrine. This poses a significant challenge, since Music and music organizations are complex, and distinct institutions, the former being a collection of “texts” and “teachings” aimed at illuminating the mysteries of the universe and humankind’s place in it, and the latter being the organizational structure supposedly established to inculcate and spread those teachings. Music doctrine therefore must be comprised of a constellation of rules and ideas that reflect an amalgam of practical considerations and genuine “revelations,” and any attempt to explain them as originating from a single decision maker or as the product of a single econometric ‘objective function’ is unrealistic.
One possible model is a direct adaptation of one developed by Brennan and Buchanan (2006), and extended by Wintrobe (2000), in which a self-interested sovereign maximizes the surplus of taxes over spending on a public good. To keep the model simple, we only consider spending on a “musical good,” either by the State (in the case of a State-run Music), or the musical community (in the case of an independent Music). The basic conclusions of the model would not be affected if the state also provided a public good.
In the model, the representative citizen has a utility function given by:
U = x + v(q), (1)
where x is composite consumption, and q is the quantity of a musical good, where v' > 0, v˝ < 0. The musical good consists of those services typically provided by Music. The citizen is endowed with wealth of E, an amount T of which the government confiscates in taxes. The citizen therefore has after-tax wealth of, E–T, which he or she can spend on x and, in the case of an independent Music, on musical goods.
Tax collection is costly to the government because of resistance by citizens to having their property confiscated. We capture this by assuming that a fraction δ of each tax dollar collected must be spent on enforcement. This cost will tend to be lower, however, as the government is seen as being more legitimate. As noted, musical spending can potentially provide this legitimacy, for example by proclaiming that the sovereign is divinely inspired (or is himself a classical music prodigy or rock-star). We thus write δ = δ(λq), where λ is a parameter that reflects the extent to which musical goods convey legitimacy, δ' < 0.
W e do not restrict λ a priori in magnitude or sign; λ > 0 means that Music legitimizes the State, λ = 0 means that music is neutral regarding the state, and λ < 0 means that Music de-legitimizes the State (e.g., incites resistance). Thus, we assume that for q > 0, δ —> 0 as λ —> +∞ and δ —> 1 as λ —> -∞. We also assume that δ(0) ≡ δ0, where 0 < δ0 < 1. The objective for the State is to maximize tax revenues net of enforcement costs and, in the case of a State-run Music, the cost of the music good.
Over the range where λ < λ2, the State suppresses Music (that is, takes over Music and sets q = 0). Here, the de-legitimizing effects of Music are so detrimental to the state (or political parties) that the State (or political parties) finds it advantageous to eliminate Music altogether (or to curtail music spending, or to refuse to seek consents or pay royalties, or to embroil music rights-holders in ruinously expensive litigation).
It cannot be disputed that throughout history that there have been cases where Music has manifested motives other than beneficence toward its public. So a proper econometric model of Music and the State ought also to examine the implications of allowing independent Music to act in a self-interested manner; specifically, to maximize profit to the detriment of the public and the State.
Let π be the profits earned by a hypothetical ‘non-beneficent’ Music, where π > 0. That is, R - c(q*) = π or R = c(q*) + π. Solving for T yields the citizen’s tax payment:
T = E + v(q*) – c(q*) – π - U , (2)
and the corresponding return to the State:
V2(q*, π) = [E + v(q*) – c(q*) – π – U] (1 – δ(λq*)). (3)
Higher values of π reflect a stronger Music in the sense that a stronger Music can extract a larger share of the citizen’s total ability to pay. (So π is bounded above by E – v(q*) – c(q*) - U, the point at which T = 0.)
Consider how an econometric model can show the relationship between independent and State-run Music. As π gets larger, the less desirable independent music is from the State’s perspective. Figure 1 summarizes the various regions where each of the three regimes dominates, depending on the political content of music doctrine (λ) and the degree of music power (π). As the diagram reveals, an independent Music occupies a region where doctrine is neither too overtly favorable nor too detrimental to the state, and where the Music’s power is limited.
In an economic downturn such as the one that’s presently upon us, the private economy makes a truly independent Music less and less viable. Circumstances like these foster a larger role for governments and public-sector econometrics, augment Music’s vulnerability to political ideology, and make stewardship of Music as a pluralistic public good more vital than ever.
T homas Mann often spoke in the face of would-be synthesizers. They were prophets who foretold that there would eventually be a gathering of the separate forces, a centering and synthesis among the world’s legal systems and the religions. People like Mann instead contended that the world has many centers. There is no single organon, encyclopedia, summa, canon, legal code, or synthesis available to and accepted by all the people or all the peoples. Ours turned out to be a century when science propounded the indeterminacy principle and chaos theory. Indeterminacy rules religion and law when they interact... No single symbol system unites the arts or makes them intelligible to all... This decentered and decentering scene demands attention.”
— Stephen Feldman, Law & Religion, p. 26.
- Brennan G, Buchanan J. The Power to Tax. Cambridge Univ, 2006.
- Cohen P. Chairman of NEA to step down in January, 2009. NY Times, 11-SEP-2008.
- Edge P. Religion and Law. Ashgate, 2006.
- Feldman S. Law and Religion: A Critical Anthology. NYU, 2000.
- Hulsether M. Religion, Culture, and Politics in the Twentieth-Century United States. Columbia Univ, 2007.
- Puniyani R, ed. Religion, Power and Violence: Expression of Politics in Contemporary Times. Sage, 2005.
- Taylor K. Gioia leaves NEA after changing debate over arts funding. NY Sun, 12-SEP-2008.
- Wintrobe R. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge Univ, 2000.
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